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Towards a Doctrine of Fair Use in Some of Patent Law
by Joshua I. Miller*
I. Introduction
Historically, the Supreme Court has compared 
patent and copyright laws.1  These comparisons 
frequently result in the application of some patent 
doctrines to copyright law.2  For example, the Supreme 
Court derived copyright’s secondary liability standard 
from patent law.3  Following the Court’s example, 
several circuit courts have read patent standards into 
copyright law.4
The doctrinal overlap, evidenced by the cross 
application of these standards, is not surprising given 
the close relationship between the copyright and patent 
regimes.5  Both patent and copyright arise from the 
Constitution’s Progress Clause, which grants Congress 
the power to “promote the Progress of Science and the 
Useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
* Candidate for LL.M., George Washington University 
Law School; 2009-2010 University of Pittsburgh School of Law 
Samuelson/Glushko Fellow; Lead Notes & Comments Editor, J.L. 
& COM.; J.D., University of Pittsburgh School of Law, May 2010.
1.  See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 188 (2003) 
(noting in a copyright case that “the Court’s inquiry is significantly 
informed by the fact that early Congresses extended the duration 
of numerous individual patents as well as copyrights” and that “the 
Court has found no constitutional barrier to the legislative expansion 
of existing patents”); Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102 (1879) 
(comparing the “province” of patent and copyright).
2.  See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 
464 U.S. 417, 440-42 (1984) (importing patent’s staple article 
doctrine into copyright); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. 
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 935 n.10 (2005) (noting that patent 
law’s staple article doctrine does not exempt from liability those who 
induce infringement).
3.  See Sony, 464 U.S. at 440-42 (importing the “staple 
article” doctrine as safe harbor to secondary liability for copyright 
infringement); see also Grokster, 545 U.S. at 936 (holding that 
patent’s inducement rule is “a sensible one for copyright.”).
4.  The best example of this is the standard for copyright misuse, 
which was first imported into copyright by the Fourth Circuit.  See 
Lasercomb America, Inc. v. Reynolds, 911 F.2d 970, 973 (4th 
Cir. 1990). Other circuits followed the Fourth Circuit’s example 
in adopting a copyright misuse standard. See A&M Records, Inc. 
v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2001); DSC 
Communications Corp. v. DGI Techs., Inc., 81 F.3d 597, 601 (5th 
Cir. 1996).
5.  See Dotal Oliar, The (Constitutional) Convention on IP: A 
New Reading, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 421, 463-69 (2009) (suggesting that 
the IP Clause should not be read disjunctively). Cf. Karl B. Lutz, 
Patents and Science: A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, 18 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 50, 51 (1949) (presenting the 
IP Clause as providing two independent powers).
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Writings and Discoveries.”6  Both laws enable owners 
of intangible property to recover for infringement of 
that property.7  Even with the judicial recognition 
of a close relationship between the regimes, recent 
scholarship suggests that the two regimes’ constitutional 
relationship is even closer than is widely accepted.8
Problematically, some courts have “delegated” 
potentially copyrightable material to patent law.910  By 
excluding these subject matter areas from copyright, 
courts have withdrawn certain limitations on exclusive 
rights that could otherwise apply.  Specifically, fair use 
is a limiting doctrine in copyright law that enhances 
the promotion of progress mandated by the Progress 
Clause, but the doctrine is not applied in patent law.
Copyright’s fair use doctrine is used to 
promote progress in several ways.  Although copyright 
can act to restrict free speech, the Framers intended 
that it operate to the contrary.11  The mechanism of 
fair use ensures that copyright remains “the engine of 
free expression,” and that it does not offend the First 
Amendment.  Fair use, therefore, operates to ensure 
that copyright works towards its intended purpose.12
Perhaps more importantly, at least from the 
standpoints of economics and progress, fair use operates 
6.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
7.  See 17 U.S.C. § 501 (copyright infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 
271 (patent infringement). 
8.  See Oliar, supra note 5, at 463-69.
9.  See Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use 
in Patent Law, 100 Colum. L. Rev. 1177, 1228 (2000) (discussing 
the delegation of application programming interfaces to patent law); 
id. at 1211 (questioning if patent law is the best form of intellectual 
property protection for APIs, which are the “connectivity components 
of operating systems that specify how a particular operating system 
and its applications communicate”).
10.  See Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1105, 1135 (1990) (stating that “copyright often results in 
suppression of speech”).
11.  Harper & Row Publ’rs Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 558 (1985) (“[T]he Framers intended copyright . . . to be the 
engine of free expression.”).
12.  See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: 
A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case, 82 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1600 (1982) (illustrating how courts have employed fair use 
to remedy market failure).
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to remedy market failures.1314  From an economic 
perspective, copyright presumes that the market will 
operate to serve social purposes.15  A market failure 
arises where a socially desirable transfer is unlikely to 
occur, such that there is an economic need for allowing 
nonconsensual transfer.16  Examples of market failure 
include barriers to entry and the use of intellectual 
property rights to control the flow of information.17  
Copyright can create these types of market failure.18  
Where such failures occur, copyright operates to inhibit 
progress, rather than promote it.  In these situations, 
fair use can act to remedy the market failure.19
Unlike copyright, patent law has traditionally 
been centered on mechanical technologies.2021  These 
scientific and technological fields have not generally 
been susceptible to market failure concerns.22  However, 
since the 1950s, non-mechanical fields have become 
increasingly important in intellectual property law.23  
Software and business methods are among these non-
mechanical fields.24  Unlike most historically patent-
13.  Id. at 1614 (“courts in the copyright area ordinarily assume 
that reliance on the market will serve social purposes”).
14.  Id. at 1615 (discussing market failure).
15.  Id. at 1627-30 (discussing barriers to entry as a market 
failure); id. at 1632 (discussing control of information flow as a 
market failure).
16.  See id. at 1627-30 (discussing copyright as a barrier to 
entry); id. at 1632 (discussing the use of copyright to control the 
flow of information).
17.  See, e.g., id. at 1601 (noting that fair use has been used to 
permit uncompensated transfers “not capable of effectuation through 
the market.”).
18.  See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law 
Technology-Specific?, 17 Berkeley Tech. L.J. 1155, 1159 (2002) 
[hereinafter Technology-Specific] (noting that most inventions were 
still mechanical in the 1950s, although newer technologies, including 
software, have become more important).
19.  See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1197 (noting that the 
justifications for fair use have “seldom been implicated in patent 
law.”).
20.  See Technology-Specific, supra note 18, at 1159 (noting 
that patent has lost its “primarily mechanical character” over 
the last half-century as patent has embraced biotechnology, 
semiconductors, computer hardware and software, electronics, and 
communications).
21.  See id. (noting the expansion of patent to software); 
Hearing on Issues Relating to the Patenting of Tax Advice Before the 
Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways & 
Means, 109th Cong. 8 (2006), available at http://waysandmeans.
house.gov/Hearings/transcript.aspx?NewsID=10219 (presenting 
data on increase in business method patent applications).
22.  Since both fields are also subject to network effects, they 
raise special market failure concerns. See infra Part III.
23.  See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1193 (“a brief review shows 
that while some of patent’s scope-limiting devices bear a surface 
resemblance to copyright fair use, none, alone or in combination 
with others, functions as its equivalent.”).
24.  Id. at 1205.
eligible fields, these new fields are susceptible to special 
market failure concerns.25  Despite these evolving 
concerns regarding new technological fields, patent 
law does not have any limiting doctrines equivalent to 
copyright’s fair use doctrine.26
Professor Maureen O’Rourke has made an 
in-depth proposal to address patent’s lack of a fair use 
standard.  She proposed a five-factor test for patent 
fair use: (i) the nature of the advance represented by 
the infringement, (ii) the purpose of the infringing 
use, (iii) the nature and strength of the market failure 
that prevents a license from being concluded, (iv) the 
impact of the use on the patentee’s incentives and 
overall social welfare, and (v) the nature of the patented 
work.
This paper agrees with Professor O’Rourke’s 
general thesis – patent law does need a fair use doctrine. 
This paper also differs from Professor O’Rourke’s 
proposal regarding implementation of fair use in patent 
law, arguing instead that patent’s fair use doctrine 
should be technology-specific: fair use does not need 
apply to all industries, but should instead only apply 
to industries and technologies that raise network 
effect concerns.  Network effects arise in relation to 
a particular product or innovation when each unit of 
that product becomes more valuable as more people use 
it. Network effects can make market entry incredibly 
difficult, and can also enable small groups of firms to 
control the flow of information, both of which are 
forms of market failure.
This paper argues that patent law should have 
a fair use standard that is applicable only to those 
technological industries that can benefit the most from 
the standard.  Part II discusses justifications, including 
those discussed by Professor O’Rourke, for importing a 
fair use standard into patent law.  Part II first presents 
structural arguments based on the similarities between 
patent and copyright and then proceeds to present 
arguments for patent fair use based on market and 
legal shifts.  Part III argues that a technology-specific 
application of the fair use doctrine can adequately 
address the concerns raised in Part II.  Part IV proposes 
a modified version of Professor O’Rourke’s fair use 
25.  See infra Part III. Microsoft Windows, for example, is a 
product exhibiting strong network effects. As more people use 
Windows, it becomes more valuable because more programmers will 
produce compatible software. As some software becomes exclusively 
available on Windows, more people will want access to Windows. As 
demand increases, so does cost.
26.  See Gordon, supra note 12, at 1627-32 (referring to both 
barriers to entry and information flow as market failures).
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standard that removes much of the recognized difficulty 
in Professor O’Rourke’s proposal.  Part V offers some 
observations in conclusion
II. Justifications for Fair Use in Patent Law
Comparisons between the copyright and 
patent regimes are becoming more pertinent as 
the subject matter of the two regimes increasingly 
overlaps.27 Four separate “structural” areas inform 
such comparisons, and each area supports a fair use 
standard in patent law.  Beyond these structural issues, 
concurrent market and legal shifts also support the 
application of fair use to patent law.
A. Structural Issues
The Progress Clause grants Congress the power 
to pass both copyright and patent laws.28 The Progress 
Clause is commonly read in the disjunctive; in other 
words, it is assumed that there are two separate powers 
contained within the Progress Clause.29 The first is the 
power “to promote the progress of science, by securing 
for limited times to authors the exclusive right to their 
writings,” referring to copyright law.30 The other is 
the power “to promote the progress of useful arts, by 
securing for limited times to inventors the exclusive 
right to their discoveries,” referring to patent law.31  
Recent scholarship indicates that the “two” clauses 
were not intended to be separate, but were originally 
intended to complement each other.32  If the two 
clauses are indeed as closely related as suggested by that 
scholarship, then perhaps there should be even more 
doctrinal overlap than the courts have recognized, 
including a fair use standard in patent law.
27.  For example, business methods and software are both 
potentially patentable. See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.Ct. 3218, 3228 
(2010) (stating that the term “method” in the Patent Act “may 
include at least some methods of doing business.”); Id. at 3227 
(noting that computer programs may be patentable). Additionally, 
they may both be copyrightable. It is well established that software 
may be copyrightable. See Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin 
Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding computer 
programs copyrightable). Similarly, if business method patents 
place restriction on “human activity,” as Judge Dyk of the Federal 
Circuit has said, then they may apply to expressive content, which 
is copyrightable. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 970 (Fed. Cir. 2008) 
(Dyk, J., concurring) (describing business method patents as placing 
limitations on “human activity”).
28.  U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl.  8.
29.  See Lutz, supra note 5, at 51 (presenting the Progress Clause 
as providing two independent powers).
30.  See Oliar, supra note 5, at 463 (describing the disjunctive 
copyright power).
31.  See id. (describing the disjunctive patent power).
32.  See id. at 463-69 (discussing the roots of the IP Clause in 
James Madison’s and Charles Pinkney’s proposals).
The two regimes also share similar theoretical 
underpinnings in implementation.  In both regimes, 
the constitutional requirement of promoting progress 
is commonly viewed as a requirement to encourage 
innovation.33  Encouraging innovation is necessary 
because intellectual property rights are public goods 
– once information is made public, more than one 
person can consume it without depleting anyone 
else’s share, and the originator cannot easily recover 
for the use of others.34  Both regimes seek to balance 
encouraging innovation with the ability to innovate 
further.35  In both regimes, these goals are achieved by 
providing a list of rights and standards of infringement 
from which an owner can recover.36  Both regimes are 
directed toward balancing innovation with protecting 
an innovator’s rights in his or her creation, and fair use 
helps copyright achieve this goal; therefore, it seems 
likely that fair use can provide similar assistance to 
patent law.
Third, it is notable that patent law has very 
strict standards, which must be met before any 
rights are created, while copyright has relatively few 
requirements.37  Due in part to these strict standards, 
the patent right is significantly stronger than the 
copyright.38  It is therefore easier for a single party 
to obstruct progress in a given field with a patent, 
33.  See Carlos A. Primo Braga & Carsten Fink, The Economic 
Justification for the Grant of Intellectual Property Rights: Patterns 
of Convergence and Conflict, 72 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 439 (1996) 
(IP rights are “second-best solutions” to public good problems); 
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis 
of Copyright Law, 18 J. Legal Stud. 325, 326 (1989) (describing 
copyright as a trade-off between the costs of limited access and the 
benefits of providing incentives to create).
34.  See, e.g., Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law & Econ. 
42-43 (3d ed. 1999) (characterizing public goods as defined by 
non-rivalrous consumption and nonexcludability); Mark A. Lemley, 
The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 Tex. 
L. Rev. 989, 994-96 (1997) (describing a public good as one that 
“may be ‘consumed’ by many people without depletion”).
35.  See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1183 (patent and copyright 
“seek not only to reward the first-comer who originates a particular 
creation, but also to preserve sufficient information for the public to 
produce additional works.”).
36.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (enumerating the exclusive rights of 
copyright holders); 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (granting patent owner the 
right to exclude others from “mak[ing], us[ing], offer[ing] to sell, or 
sell[ing]” a patented invention); see also 17 U.S.C. § 501 (providing 
for copyright infringement); 35 U.S.C. § 271 (providing for patent 
infringement).
37.  Compare 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103 and 112 (requiring 
proper subject matter, novelty, non-obviousness and enablement for 
an invention to be patentable) with 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (requiring 
only that a work of authorship be fixed in a tangible medium of 
expression).
38.  See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1186 (describing the patent 
right as “more extensive” than copyright).
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particularly one that forms the foundation of an 
industry or product, than a copyright.  The ability for 
one party to hinder innovation – and create market 
failures – when it acquires a foundational patent 
supports a call for a fair use standard in patent law, to 
allow access for a follow-on innovator to that area of 
technology.
Lastly, the two regimes employ different 
schemes to limit the scope of the right conveyed, and 
these schemes make it is easier for copyright to adapt 
to meet new and innovative uses of protected subject 
matter.39  The scope of a patent is established during 
the Patent and Trademark Office’s examination of a 
patent application.40  Once granted, the patent’s scope 
is defined by its claims.41  The scope of a copyright, 
on the other hand, is largely established after creation, 
frequently through fair use.42  Fair use in patent would 
allow the law to adapt to changing circumstances after 
the issuance of the patent, just as it does in copyright.
B. Market and Legal Shifts 
Two related shifts also support the application 
of a fair use standard to patent law.  The first is a 
market shift.  The second is a general legal shift.  
These shifts have occurred together in something of a 
symbiotic relationship.
At first glance, it appears sensible that 
copyright law has a fair use standard while patent law 
does not.  Because copyright applies to expression, 
including activity, while patent law is viewed as 
technology-oriented, copyright often runs afoul of the 
First Amendment because it can restrict expression 
and activity, while historically speaking, patent could 
not.43  Copyright’s potential restriction on free speech 
39.  Id. at 1184 (“[Patent law] is relatively less amenable than 
copyright to adjusting the scope of the right once granted.”).
40.  See id. at 1186 (describing PTO examination as establishing 
the “metes and bounds of the inventor’s property right”).
41.  35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The specification shall conclude with 
one or more claims particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming 
the subject matter which the applicant regards as his invention.”). 
Patent claims set out the “metes and bounds” of what the inventor 
claims as his invention. See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1186.
42.  See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1184 (noting that 
copyright has “few requirements for initial protection,” but that it 
still has several scope-limiting doctrines).
43.  See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (protecting public performance of a 
copyrighted work). See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 
U.S. 370, 390 (1996) (noting that the Federal Circuit was created 
as an exclusive appellate court for patent cases in the hopes that 
“increased uniformity would ‘strengthen the United States patent 
system in such a way as to foster technological growth and industrial 
innovation.’”) (emphasis added); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft 
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-151 (1989) (“The federal patent 
system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for encouraging 
is a market failure because it acts as a control on the 
flow of information.  Additionally, a given patent only 
restricts access to the innovation as claimed, while 
a given copyrighted work can restrict works merely 
based upon it.44  A copyright may therefore cover more 
“things,” making market failure more likely to occur 
with a copyright.45  Fair use acts to alleviate these ills by 
restricting the scope of the copyright.
These generalities of subject matter and 
scope hold true in the traditional patent technology 
areas, such as the mechanical arts.  The traditional 
patentable mechanical areas can be claimed in relatively 
straightforward ways.46  The doctrine of equivalents, the 
rule that an equivalent device or process can infringe 
a patent claim even if not within the literal scope of 
a patent claim, cannot easily extend a mechanical 
invention’s scope.47  For example, depending upon the 
language used in the claim, a screw element in a patent 
claim can be equivalent to other fasteners, such as a 
the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious advances 
in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice 
the invention for a period of years.”) (emphasis added); Paulik v. 
Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (to be 
patentable, a claim must further the purpose “of advancing the useful 
arts - the process today called technological innovation.”). See also 
James S. Sfekas, Controlling Business Method Patents: How the Japanese 
Standard for Patenting Software Could Bring Reasonable Limitations to 
Business Method Patents in the United States, 16 Pac. Rim. L. & Pol’y 
J. 197, 214-15 (2007) “[T]he [Supreme] Court’s holdings in Benson 
and Diehr are really stating a requirement that inventions must be 
technological.”). But see Oliar, supra note 5, at 464-69 (discussing 
alternative interpretations of the Progress Clause that could result in 
patent protection for innovations outside the useful arts).
44.  See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (defining a “derivative work” as “a work 
based upon one or more preexisting works”); 35 U.S.C. § 112 (“The 
specification shall conclude with one or more claims particularly 
pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
applicant regards as his invention.”).
45.  This statement appears to be contrary to that in the 
third structural point, supra Part II.A, but it is actually not. The 
only instances where patent creates broad barriers to entry are 
foundational patents. A patent on a device that comprises legs, a seat 
section, and a back would block most other forms of chair, including 
rocking chairs, couches, some stools, computer chairs, etc. However, 
such foundational patents are not the norm. Generally, patents 
only protect a species within a given genus, not the entire genus. 
Copyright, on the other hand, may easily cover more than a single 
species through its derivative works doctrine.
46.  See Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 18, at 
1159.
47.  There are two tests under the doctrine of equivalents. The 
first, called the “triple identity” test, deems something equivalent if 
it: (1) performs substantially the same function; (2) in substantially 
the same way; (3) to yield substantially the same result. See Graver 
Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 
(1950). Second, something may be deemed equivalent if there is 
only an “insubstantial difference” between the accused device and 
the patented device. See Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc. v. Hilton Davis 
Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 39-40 (1997).
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nail, a tack, or possibly even tape, but it is unlikely that 
the doctrine of equivalents will extend beyond such 
apparent equivalents.  The determination of equivalence 
is somewhat simple and does not dramatically expand 
the scope of a patent.
As the technologies that patent law 
encompasses progress further from patent law’s more 
traditionally mechanical roots, the equivalence doctrine 
becomes more nebulous, and accurate determinations 
of what constitutes an equivalent become more 
difficult.  For example, in Graver Tank, expert witnesses 
were asked to ascertain the equivalence of two elements: 
manganese and magnesium.48  Graver Tank presents a 
more difficult question than whether a nail and screw 
are similar, even though in Graver Tank the subject 
matter is much closer to mechanical than some fields 
now able to receive patent protection.  In information 
technology fields, where terminology is still 
inconsistent across industries, questions of equivalence 
are more difficult still.  Experts may prove to be of no 
service in these industries because of this inconsistency.  
Where two experts may refer to the same thing in 
different ways, or use the same terminology for two 
different things, the value of expert testimony in the 
equivalency determination is significantly diminished.  
As equivalency becomes more difficult to determine, 
the doctrine of equivalents can be manipulated to 
stretch the scope of a given patent, which increases the 
likelihood of market failure by increasing barriers to 
entry.
Technological evolution and the development 
of new technological fields have pushed the bounds 
of patent law, making old standards increasingly more 
difficult to apply to new innovations.  Technology 
has introduced significant challenges based on its 
increasingly expressive content and its growing 
potential to induce market failure.49
Although patent law’s increasing scope is 
at least partially due to technological advances, it 
appears that purely legal shifts have contributed to 
the increase as well.  For example, some have argued 
that the consolidation of patent appeals in one court 
48.  See Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 610-11 (discussing similarities 
and differences between manganese and magnesium). 
49.  See In re Bilski, 545 F.2d at 970 (Dyk, J., concurring) 
(describing business method patents as placing limitations on “human 
activity”). Also, because computer programs are copyrightable as 
“literary works,” Apple Computer, 714 F.2d at 1249, then they are a 
form of expression. See 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1).
has created a strong pro-patent bias.50  Decisions such 
as State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial 
Group, Inc.,51 are used as evidence of this pro-patent 
bias and are characterized as sweeping departures from 
precedent – in the case of State Street, for ignoring the 
“business method exception.”52  Decisions like State 
Street, whether or not they evidence a pro-patent bias, 
have made clear that patent protection extends to new 
areas of innovation.
Regardless of the motivation – legal, 
technological, or a mixture of the two – the increasing 
scope of patent-eligible subject matter is undeniable.  
As market and legal shifts lead to eligibility for new, 
non-traditional subject matter, the likelihood increases 
that patent law will more frequently lead to undesirable 
market failures.  Structural comparisons with copyright 
law and recent shifts in technology and patent law 
support importation of a fair use standard to patent 
law.
III. Technology-Specific Application of 
Patent Law
Historically, patent law has “worked” well.  
Seemingly, innovation has been encouraged, and 
patent law has generally expanded to encompass new 
technologies.  However, the viability of patent law was 
not significantly tested outside mechanical fields until 
the last half of the twentieth century.53
Patent law is written as a general set of rules 
for a wide range of technologies.54  However, patent law 
has not been applied consistently across technologies.  
While patent law only rarely distinguishes between 
industries on its face, courts have sub silentio applied 
different rules to different fields.55  For example, 
50.  See Peter S. Menell, The Property Rights Movement’s 
Embrace of Intellectual Property: True Love or Doomed Relationship?, 
34 Ecology L.Q. 713, 732 (2007) (“the unification of appellate 
decision making in a single body had the effect of creating a strong 
pro-patent bias in the interpretation of patent law.”).
51.  See State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp. 149 
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding business methods patentable).
52.  See Leo J. Raskind, The State Street Bank Decision: The 
Bad Business of Unlimited Patent Protection for Methods of Doing 
Business, 10 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 61, 61 
(1999) (characterizing State Street as “so sweeping a departure from 
precedent as to invite a search for its justification.”).
53.  See Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 18, at 
1159 (describing new technologies patent law has encompassed).
54.  Id. at 1156 (describing patent law as “a general set of legal 
rules” applicable to “a wide variety of technologies.”).
55.  See, e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 161 (providing standards 
for patenting plants); 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (creating a special 
obviousness standard for biotechnology). See also Burk & Lemley, 
Technology-Specific, supra note 18; Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, 
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biotech patents are more frequently found non-obvious 
than those from most industries, but they are also 
subject to more stringent enablement and written 
description requirements.56  Software, on the other 
hand, has been “excused” from the enablement and best 
mode requirements.57  The difficulty patent has had in 
consistency across technologies appears to be a thing of 
the recent past.
Patent law has some fair use-like doctrines,58 
but none of these doctrines, alone or in combination, 
function as the complete equivalent of fair use.59  
These doctrines are all rooted in mechanical industries 
that have historically been largely immune to market 
failures, but they do not adequately address new 
technologies.60  Specifically, with the emergence of 
technological fields that raise network concerns, such 
as software and business methods, patent law is more 
likely to result in market failures including barriers to 
entry and the control of information flow.
Professor O’Rourke implicitly recognizes 
the point that network industries raise special market 
failure concerns.  O’Rourke emphasizes one industry 
that could benefit most from a fair use standard: 
software.61  Part of what makes software special in 
patent law is that it is among the new technological 
fields that exhibit strong network effects.  Network 
effects arise when a good “provide[s] inherent value to 
consumers that increases with the number of additional 
users of identical and/or interoperable goods.”62  The 
Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1575 (2003).
56.  Burk & Lemley, Technology-Specific, supra note 18, at 
1156.
57.  See id. (“The Federal Circuit has essentially excused software 
inventions from compliance with the enablement and best mode 
requirements”).
58.  See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1192-93 (“The scope-limiting 
doctrines available to a patent court are the ability to re-evaluate 
the patent’s validity and construe its claims; the reverse doctrine of 
equivalents; the doctrine of blocking patents; the experimental use 
exception; and patent misuse.”).
59.  See id. at 1193 (“a brief review shows that while some of 
patent’s scope-limiting devices bear a surface resemblance to copyright 
fair use, none, alone or in combination with others, functions as its 
equivalent.”).
60.  See id. at 1197 (“the theoretical justification for copyright 
fair use--the ‘market failure’ rationale--historically has seldom been 
implicated in patent law.”). See also infra Part II.B.1 (discussing 
how the doctrine of equivalents does not adequately address new 
technologies).
61.  See id. at 1211-35 (discussing software in the context of 
network effects).
62.  Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications 
of Network Economic Effects, 86 Cal. L. Rev. 479, 491 (1998); see 
Peter S. Menell, An Epitaph for Traditional Copyright Protection 
of Network Features of Computer Software, 43 Antitrust Bull. 
value of software, especially operating system software, 
is largely dependent upon the number of people using 
it.63  Business methods, particularly those used in 
online transactions, similarly become more valuable in 
each instance as the method becomes more universal.64
Network effect industries are susceptible to 
major market entry barriers, which are a strong form 
of market failure.65  Network effect industries also 
enable one owner to control the flow of information 
by placing limitations upon access: some goods 
or application programs may only be available for 
purchase through certain business methods or on 
certain operating systems.  Professor O’Rourke’s specific 
reference to network effects suggests that only those 
industries susceptible to these special concerns should 
have a fair use standard.66
Because fair use is designed to mitigate 
the harms of market failure due to the exercise of 
intellectual property rights, a workable patent fair use 
doctrine will remedy the market failures inherent in 
network industries.  Limiting patent fair use to network 
industries further ensures that a fair use doctrine in 
patent would address the same concerns of the fair 
use doctrine in copyright; namely, it would act to cure 
market failures.  This limitation to network industries 
also ensures that the fair use exception is not applied to 
traditional patent fields, which have historically been 
subject to innovation without a fair use doctrine.
IV.  Implementation: A Four-Factor Test for Fair 
Use in Patent Law
Professor O’Rourke proposed a five-factor test 
for determining whether use of a patented invention 
651, 657 (1998) (“The defining feature of virtual networks is that 
the value of a product depends significantly on the value of the 
system in which it is a part. A critical determinant of the value 
of a product, therefore, is the range and value of components 
with which it is interoperable.”). Two prime examples of network 
effect goods are telephones and Microsoft Windows. See generally 
O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1212 (introducing telephones as a 
network industry); id. at 1213 (discussing the network effects of 
Windows).
63.  See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1213 (discussing Windows 
and compatibility issues).
64.  Paypal is an example of a business method that gains value 
as it becomes more widely used. The more websites and people that 
use paypal, the more valuable it becomes.
65.  See id. at 1179 (“in the market for operating systems 
software, which exhibits powerful network effects, strong patent 
protection can create an insurmountable barrier to entry while also 
allowing a single patentee to direct innovation in the market for 
applications running on the dominant system.”).
66.  See id., at 1212-19 (discussing network effects industries).
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should qualify as fair use.67  The first factor examines 
the incremental value of the infringement; the greater 
the innovation over the claimed invention, the more 
the first factor weighs in favor of fair use.68  The second 
mirrors the copyright fair use inquiry, asking whether 
the infringing use is done for a non-commercial, 
indirectly commercial, or directly commercial use.69  
Use that is less commercial is more likely to be fair.  
The third factor examines the type of market failure 
that has led to the necessity of infringement.70  The 
fourth factor corresponds to the copyright question of 
whether a work is transformative: if the infringing use 
does not adversely impact the market for the patented 
work, this factor supports a finding of fair use.71  The 
fifth factor mirrors the first, except it examines the 
patented work: when the patented invention is less 
pioneering, fair use is likelier.72
The first and fifth factors bear examination 
because of the special concerns they raise in network 
markets.  Just as the courts have difficulty determining 
the “value” of a work of art, and should therefore 
refrain from doing so, assigning a “value” to a given 
innovation presents difficult issues for a court and 
introduces substantial uncertainty into Professor 
O’Rourke’s proposed fair use test.73  Courts should 
not be asked to make such difficult subjective 
determinations because they inject a substantial degree 
uncertainty into the law.
While the risk of inconsistent subjective 
determinations is present in examining both factors, 
it is substantially greater in examining the accused 
infringing product.  For the patented innovation, there 
will necessarily be evidence that speaks to the degree 
of innovation.  The patent application itself presents 
evidence of what the inventor saw as prior art and 
how the inventor thought his invention improved 
upon the prior art.74  Because the patented invention 
necessarily includes the patent’s prosecution history, 
there will be evidence that can provide useful insights 
67.  See id. at 1205.
68.  See id. at 1206 (discussing the first proposed factor).
69.  Id.
70.  Id.
71.  Id. at 1207.
72.  Id. at 1208.
73.  See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 
239, 251 (1903) (stating that “[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking 
for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final 
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations”).
74.  See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 
2005) (“the prosecution history provides evidence of how the PTO 
and the inventor understood the patent.”).
into the assumed contribution to the art at the time of 
patenting from the perspective of both the inventor and 
the Patent Office.
Unless the infringing invention is also 
patented, the infringing product may have no such 
prosecution history, which makes it particularly 
difficult for a court to accurately determine the value of 
that advance.  Additionally, because a court would not 
need to reach the fair use question unless the follow-on 
innovation was within the scope of the patent’s claims, 
there is the additional likelihood of prejudice against 
the follow-on innovation in Professor O’Rourke’s 
proposed test.  This is because the new innovation is 
covered by the patent’s claims, so regardless of the level 
or quality of the innovation, the follow-on will appear 
to be less innovative by virtue of falling within the 
patent’s claims.
Turning now to this article’s proposed fair 
use standard, because this article proposes applying 
fair use only to industries that exhibit network effects, 
the first factor of Professor O’Rourke’s proposal is 
moot.  Entry into a market subject to network effects 
requires compatibility with the network standard, so 
any advancement is almost certain to be extremely 
incremental, and Professor O’Rourke acknowledges 
that this factor has its least effect in these markets.75  
Removal of the first O’Rourke element results in an 
industry-specific test that includes four-factors: (i) 
the purpose of the infringing use, (ii) the nature and 
strength of the market failure that prevents a license 
from being concluded, (iii) the impact of the use on the 
patentee’s incentives and overall social welfare, and (iv) 
the nature of the patented work.  This industry-specific 
test removes the most difficult and inaccurate question 
in the O’Rourke test, resulting in a simplified, more 
workable four-factor test for courts to examine.
As Professor O’Rourke acknowledged in her 
original proposal, the infringing advance element has 
little force in network markets, where compatibility 
necessarily limits innovation.76  The difficulties 
referenced above can be avoided by using this 
acknowledgement to limit fair use to network markets, 
thereby eliminating the first element of the O’Rourke 
test.
75.  See O’Rourke, supra note 9, at 1206 (stating that the 
infringing advance element “has its least force in the case of network 
markets where compatibility with the industry standard is required 
for market entry.”).
76.  Id. 
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IV.  CONCLUSION
While Professor O’Rourke’s general thesis 
is correct – patent law does need a fair use doctrine 
– her implementation leaves something to be 
desired.  She implicitly acknowledges that software 
and other network markets are most in need of a fair 
use exception, but she applies a complicated test to 
all industries.77  Courts are loath to engage in value 
judgments in copyright, and they should similarly 
avoid making those judgments in patent law.78  
It is also clear that patent law is applied 
differently between industries, even when the law does 
not facially distinguish between them.  If other areas 
of patent law can distinguish between industries, the 
fair use doctrine should distinguish between industries 
too.  Such a distinction is important because it ensures 
that patent fair use will promote innovation in network 
markets, while avoiding further legal complications in 
industries already adequately served by patent law.
By first establishing that a patent is subject to 
network effects, and then examining the four proposed 
factors, much of the difficulty in Professor O’Rourke’s 
five-part test can be avoided.  The innovative quality 
of the advancement represented by an infringer, a 
particularly difficult question given the probable lack of 
reasonable background on the matter, is no longer an 
issue the courts must address under this four-fact test.  
However, the proposed test still examines the advance 
represented by the patented work, which is well 
documented in the patent’s prosecution history.  
An industry-specific patent fair use doctrine 
could alleviate many concerns associated with network 
industries.  By tailoring fair use only to those network 
industries, the difficulties in a broadly applicable fair 
use doctrine can be avoided.  Finally, a patent fair use 
doctrine can further promote the progress that the 
Constitution mandates.
77.  See id. (noting special concerns in network markets, 
thereby indicating that the test applies to other industries, as well).
78.  See Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 251 (stating that “[i]t would 
be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law 
to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial 
illustrations”).
